Court Finds That Plaintiff Not Entitled to PIP Benefits For Injury While Operating an Electric Scooter
Plaintiff David Goyco was involved in an accident in which an automobile struck him while he was operating a low-speed electric scooter. He applied to his auto insurance company, Progressive Insurance Company, for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to pay for his medical expenses. The issue in Goyco v. Progressive Insurance Company, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1117 (App. Div. July 5, 2023) was whether the plaintiff could recover PIP benefits for his injuries suffered in the accident.
The accident happened while plaintiff was operating a Segway Ninebot KickScooter Max when he was struck by an automobile on West Grand Street in Elizabeth. This scooter has a maximum speed of 15.5 miles per hour and qualified as a “low-speed electric scooter” (“LSES”) under N.J.S.A. 39:1-1.
At the time of the accident, plaintiff had automobile insurance with Progressive Insurance Company. This policy provided personal injury benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4. Accordingly, plaintiff filed a claim with Progressive for PIP benefits.
However, Progressive denied plaintiff’s claim. In its denial letter, Progressive stated that plaintiff was ineligible for PIP benefits under the policy because New Jersey No-Fault benefits were only available if the accident involved a qualifying automobile. The scooter did not meet the definition of a qualifying automobile under New Jersey Auto Insurance Law.
Further, the denial letter stated that plaintiff also did not meet the definition of a pedestrian, which was defined as “any person who is not occupying, entering into, alighting from a vehicle propelled by other than muscular power and designed primarily for use on highways, rails and tracks.” Therefore, Progressive denied plaintiff’s application for PIP benefits.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit to challenge this denial. Plaintiff argued that New Jersey Law recognized bicycles as pedestrians for purposes of no-fault coverage. Plaintiff argued that, by extension, an electric scooter should be considered the equivalent of a bicycle.
The trial court judge found that the plaintiff was operating a scooter powered by motor at the time of the incident. It was clearly not a motor vehicle and neither in the statute nor the insurance policy would plaintiff be considered a pedestrian. Therefore, the trial court judge entered an order denying plaintiff’s PIP application and dismissing the complaint. This appeal ensued.
The Appellate Division conducted a “de novo” review of the trial court’s rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity, or interpretation of laws and statutes. The Court agreed with the trial court that under the plain language of the statute, the plaintiff did not qualify as a pedestrian. It noted that an LSES is a vehicle propelled by other than muscular power. By definition, an LSES is a vehicle that has an electric motor and, hence, plaintiff’s operation of the scooter disqualified him from being defined as a pedestrian and entitled to PIP benefits.
The Appellate Division also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the operation of an LSES should be equivalent to a bicycle. Thus, the Court upheld that portion of the trial court’s decision as well.
Accordingly, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. It agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff’s accident while operating a low-speed electric scooter did not entitle him to personal injury protection benefits to pay for his medical bills.
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